Past as prologue? The risk of adoption of chemical and biological weapons by non-state actors in the EU by Revill, James
Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of
Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State
Actors in the EU
James REVILL*
Abstract
There have been relatively few serious incidents of chemical or biological terrorism in Europe;
however, there is growing concern over how non-state groups might exploit chemistry and biology
for hostile purposes in the future. This article uses the historical record of past incidents of chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) adoption by non-state actors to inform understandings of the current
and future risks. To achieve this, the article analyses six interlinked clusters of factors that can be
seen as important in assessing the risk of whether or not to adopt such weapons. These are: the
perceived relative advantage of CBW and their utilities; the complexity of such weapons; their
ideological compatibility; the role of organisational structures; the visibility and ‘fashionability’ of
such weapons; and the wider environmental context. Drawing from past cases of CBW adoption
and the present European context, an analysis of these factors suggests that sophisticated CBW with
gigantic effect are possible, but unlikely; however, the adoption and use of scruffy low-level chemical
weapons is a distinct possibility. Accordingly, European public health agencies need to prepare for
the possibility of a variety of CBW, not all of which are likely to be weapons of “mass destruction”.
I. INTRODUCTION
Speaking at the 53rd Munich Security Conference, early in 2017, Bill Gates remarked that:
… the next epidemic could originate on the computer screen of a terrorist intent on using
genetic engineering to create a synthetic version of the smallpox virus ... or a super
contagious and deadly strain of the ﬂu… Whether it occurs by a quirk of nature or at the
hand of a terrorist, epidemiologists say a fast-moving airborne pathogen could kill more
than 30 million people in less than a year.1
The use of chemical or biological weapons by non-state actors is not a new issue, but it
has become more signiﬁcant for a number of European states over the course of the last
year. For example, Sweden described chemical weapons use by non-state actors as a
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“grave risk and a major concern”;2 Germany declared the “danger of a use of biological
agents as a weapon, in particular by terrorist groups, is to be taken seriously”;3 and,
indeed, the EU has expressed “grave concern” “about the risk of non-State actors
acquiring and using toxic chemicals”.4
There are reasonable grounds for such concern, biology is getting relatively easier,
more accessible and ever more powerful; whereas chemical weapons in the hands of
non-state actors in Syria and Iraq is a regrettable reality. Yet gloomy predictions of
apocalyptic chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in the hands of non-state actors
rather ignores a complex set of factors that feed into decisions to adopt – or reject – such
weapons, yet alone use them.
This article is part of a special issue that analyses the interactions between public
health and security policy in Europe. The article seeks to explore what the past can tell us
about the future risk of chemical and biological weapons adoption by non-state actors
with a particular focus on the risks to Europe. In doing so, it challenges some of the
bolder claims pertaining to an imminent darker chemical and biological weapons future.
It does this by exploring different factors that are likely to feed into the calculus of
whether or not such weapons will be adopted and/or used by non-state actors in the
European context, including the relative advantage of CBW, the complexity of such
weapons, the ideological compatibility, organisational factors, the visibility of such
weapons and the wider European environmental context.
An exploration of these key factors suggests that, contrary to more alarmist claims,
the seductive appeal of CBW with gigantic effect is likely to remain an unobtainable
mirage for the short-term. However, as the synthesis of the factors addressed in this
article shows, small groups of non-state actors with operationally relevant expertise are
already able to launch crude, low-level, scruffy and opportunistic chemical weapons
attacks, and this may be reﬁned in the future. This suggests that public health
preparations in Europe need to be able deal with a spectrum of CBW risks.
The paper begins with a discussion around the literature on technology adoption before
laying out a framework orientated around six clusters of factors. The paper then proceeds by
outlining the limits of using the past as prologue for understanding contemporary risks. The
clusters of factors are then explored in turn using the available empirical data pertaining to
past cases of CBW adoption and taking into account the evolving opportunities and
challenges of the European context. The paper concludes with some reﬂections on what the
past suggests about the future of CBW adoption in the European context.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR THE ADOPTION OF CBW BY NON-STATE ACTORS
The use of the term “adoption” is intended to denote the choice of a non-state actor to
pursue chemical or biological weapons with a view to the assimilation of such weapons.
2 Sweden, “Statement at the 84th Session of the Executive Council”, Eighty-Fourth Session of the Executive Council
of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW, 2017).
3 Germany, “General Statement”, Eighth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC (UN Ofﬁce in
Geneva 2016).
4 Malta on Behalf of the EU, “Statement on Behalf Of The European Union Delivered by H.E. Ambassador Joseph
Cole Permanent Representative of The Republic of Malta”, 84th Session Of The Executive Council of the OPCW
(OPCW, 2017).
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This remains a signiﬁcant part of the process of innovation,5 as Michael Horowitz notes,
a “key puzzle is how terrorist groups decide whether to adopt the innovation”.6
To explore this question, this article develops a framework for analysis of CBW
adoption by non-state actors. The framework is not proposed as a perfect typology of
factors that inﬂuence non-state adoption, nor are the clusters of factors neatly delineated,
isolated groupings that can be dealt with in an equal manner. On the contrary, these
factors overlap and interact with each other, with some of greater salience than others.
Nonetheless, such a framework provides a means of trying to tease out different issues to
consider in seeking to understand the risk of CBW adoption by non-state actors in the
European context, as the summary in Figure 1 below illustrates. Moreover, it does so by
building on established frameworks for thinking about adoption, speciﬁcally Roger’s
ﬁve-factoral framework for the adoption of (peaceful) technologies,7 combined with
further insights from terrorism and security scholarship including the work of, inter alia,
Crenshaw,8 Ackerman,9 Jackson10 Rasmussen,11 Bale and Dolnik.12
In employing this framework, this article eschews a technologically deterministic
approach to looking at CBW adoption, in favour of a more constructivist approach that
recognises the signiﬁcance of multiple social factors in shaping technology and innovation.
This is important as an antidote to more technologically deterministic approaches that
erroneously assume “innovation necessarily entails the widespread diffusion of new
technologies or techniques across terrorist organizations”,13 when this is not the case.14
It also seeks to draw from history whilst recognising that histories of CBW adoption by
non-state actors have their limitations: in part, because of the assumptions, interpretations
and deﬁnitions for example over what constitutes CBW; in part, because of considerable
missing information on inter alia the perpetrators, the agents used, the motivations and
indeed the validity of some reported cases;15 and, in part, because there exist several cases in
which non-events or naturally occurring phenomenon have been mistaken for – or
deliberately misrepresented as – chemical and biological weapons use.16 Such non-cases
5 A Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (Routledge, 2009) and
M Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism” (1985) 29 Orbis 465.
6 MC Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism” (2010) 64(4)
International Organization 33.
7 EM Rogers, “Diffusion of Preventive Innovations” (2002) 27 Addictive Behaviors 989, available at <http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12369480>.
8 Crenshaw, supra, note 5.
9 GA Ackerman and LE Pinson, “An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and
Autonomous Cells” (2014) 26 Terrorism and Political Violence 226, available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/09546553.2014.849945>.
10 BA Jackson and DR Frelinger, “Riﬂing through the Terrorists’ Arsenal: Exploring Groups’ Weapon Choices and
Technology Strategies” (2008) 31 Studies in Conﬂict & Terrorism 583.
11 MJ Rasmussen, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive
Indicators” (Workshop Report, August 2010), available at <http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/25358/
2010_019_Terrorist_WME.pdf?sequence=1>.
12 Dolnik, supra, note 5.
13 Rasmussen, supra, note 11, 9.
14 Horowitz, supra, note 6, 33–64.
15 J Perry Robinson, “Gaps and Lies in Information on the Ghouta Event” Harvard Sussex Program, Syria Workshop
Paper (March 2016).
16 See for example J Robinson, J Guillemin and MMeselson, “Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses” (2016) 68 Foreign
Policy 100; E Geissler and RH Sprinkle, “Disinformation Squared” (2013) 32 Politics and the Life Sciences 2;
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Figure 1. Summary of factors identiﬁed as signiﬁcant in CBW adoption
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persist perhaps because of the power of CBW allegations in propaganda and the
demonisation of adversaries; as Robinson has remarked “Accusations of association with
[CBW] have for centuries… been used by well-intentioned as well as unscrupulous people
to vilify enemies and to calumniate rivals”.17
The point is that the past record of CBW needs to be treated with caution because it is
potentially incomplete, inconsistent and contaminated with politics and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored by those seeking to make sense of the future risk of
CBW adoption by non-state groups and, whilst such factors cannot be used to predict
speciﬁc changes in the adoption of CBW, there are perhaps some generalisable lessons
that may be learned from the past that can inform the development of a framework for
thinking about CBW adoption in the future.
1. Relative advantage and utilities
The ﬁrst factor is the perceived relative advantage of chemical or biological weapons
over other means of causing harm. As Rogers points out, “[d]iffusion scholars have
found [the] relative advantage to be one of the best predictors of an innovation’s rate of
adoption”;18 moreover, several scholars of terrorist innovation have referred to the
importance of the relative advantage factor.19
Utility Example
Economic
sabotage
Animal rights activists claimed to contaminate Lucozade (UK, 1991)20
Poisoning of Sri Lanka tea crops by the LTTE (Sri Lanka, 1983)21
Mau Mau poisoning of  livestock (Kenya, 1954)22
Media
attention and 
prestige
Al Qaeda “chlorine-augmented, vehicle-borne IEDs” (Iraq, 2006)23
Animal rights activities media attention to animal testing (UK, 1991)24
Larry Wayne Harris alerting Americans to the BW threat (US, 1995)25
Figure 2. Utilities of CBW and illustrative example cases.
(F'note continued)
M Leitenberg, RA Zilinskas and JH Kuhn, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Harvard University
Press, 2012) 411; M Leitenberg, “China’s False Allegations of the Use of Biological Weapons by the United States
during the Korean War” (Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 78, 2016) 78.
17 JPP Robinson, “Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria”, Harvard Sussex Program Occasional Paper 4
(26 June 2013), available at <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/occasional papers/HSPOP_4.pdf>.
18 EM Rogers, “Attributes of Innovations and Their Rate of Adoption” in EM Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations,
4th edn (The Free Press, 1995) 216.
19 G Ackerman, ‘Appendix III: Understanding Terrorist Innovation through the Broader Innovation Context’ in
Rasmussen, supra, note 11.
20 US Dept of Justice, “Report to Congress on the Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism on
Animal Enterprises” (1993) 27.
21 WS Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900” (Centre for
Counterproloferation Research, National Defense University, Washington DC, February 2001 Revision).
22 Carus, supra, note 21.
23 A Welch, “Iraq – The Evolution of the IED” (2008) Autumn CBRNe World 12.
24 Supra, note 20.
25 J Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (MIT Press, 2000) 250.
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Yet in order to appreciate the relative advantage, it requires an understanding of the utilities
of CBW. As noted elsewhere “[n]ot all CBW are Weapons of Mass Destruction and to think
otherwise is dangerous”,37 nor is killing the only reason for the pursuit of such weapons.
Rather CBW can serve a number of possible purposes from generating fear to stimulating
media attention to economic sabotage and, indeed, there are examples where groups have
eschewed highly-lethal CBW, such as in the case of the Rajneesh Cult, in part to avoid undue
attention. Of course in some cases killing may be a key objective, but a focus on killing belies
a number of other utilities CBW may be perceived as fulﬁlling, something outlined in
Figure 2 above, which further illustrates both the long history and diversity of CBW adopters.
The frequently sensationalised media coverage of CBW and the association of CBW with
Incapacitation
Rajneesh use of salmonella to incapacitate voters (Oregon, US, 1984)
The Weather Underground efforts to incapacitate (US, 1970)26
Teargassing of Czech Gay Pride parade (Czech Republic, 2008)27
Criminal
purposes
Kuntal Patel poisoning her “controlling” mother in law (UK, 2014)28
Carol Anne Bond’s chemical assault of love rival (US, 2006)29
Spread of smallpox in Brazilian indigenous tribes (Brazil, 1957)30
Destabilisation
and disruption
SNLA contaminated vodka mailing with caustic acid (UK, 2008)31
Aum Shinrikyo use of Sarin in the Tokyo subway (Japan, 1995)32
CSA efforts to hasten the apocalypse (US, 1986)33
Deter and deny
“Pro-life” maloderant attacks on abortion clinics (Florida, 1998)34
Release of sewer water onto Palestinian land? (Khadder, 1997)35
Threatened release of chlorine by Muslim forces? (Tuzla, 1992)36
Figure 2. (Continued.)
26 JV Parachini, “The Weather Underground” in Tucker, supra, note 25, 43.
27 Trend News Agency, “Czech Republic’s First Gay Pride Parade Attacked by Rightwingers” (2008) 15 Trend News
Agency, available at <http://en.trend.az/world/other/1234372.html>.
28
“Woman Tried to Poison Mother in Plot Inspired by Breaking Bad, Court Told” The Guardian (2014).
29 C Doyle, “Bond v. United States: Validity and Construction of the Federal Chemical Weapons Statute”, CRS report
for Congress (2014) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42968.pdf>.
30 Carus, supra, note 21.
31
“Poison Plotters Jailed” Manchester Evening News (12 January 2013), available at <http://www.
manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/poison-plotters-jailed-941042>; see also D Ward,
“Nationalist Denies Sending Caustic Soda through Post” The Guardian (8 January 2008).
32 AA Nehorayoff, B Ash and DS Smith, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts”
(2016) 9(1) Journal of Strategic Security 35.
33 Tucker, supra, note 25, 250.
34 M Healy, “FBI Probing Acid Attacks at Abortion Clinics” Los Angeles Times (19 July 1998).
35 CNS, “Chronology of CBW Incidents Targeting Agriculture 1915–2008” (2008).
36 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Tuzla, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Review of the Geographical Realities”,
Intelligence Memorandum. Ofﬁce of Trade, Resources and Technology (7 July 1992).
37 J Revill, C McLeish and JP Robinson, “Case Study on Chemical and Biological Weapons”, Project on Strategic
Governance of Science and Technology (under review 2015).
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mass destruction, necessitates that in the event of an attack using these weapons, public
reactions may well be disproportionate to the casualty-causing potential of such weapons.
Whilst CBW therefore have a number of utilities, some of which can be ampliﬁed
through media hype – and public health actors need to prepare accordingly – it is also
clear that there are other means of achieving the objectives of non-state groups. Gill et al
have certainly argued that in the case of Hamas, “the fact that suicide bombings are
cheaper, less likely to alienate their constituency and more cost-effective means that this
particular manifestation of violence is far more elegant than a chemical attack…”;38
whereas the Europol TE-SAT report for 2016 stated, “Terrorists prefer the use of
conventional ﬁrearms and explosives because of their availability, simplicity and
effectiveness”.39 Indeed, IEDs have been employed for sabotage, destabilisation,
demoralisation, disruption, area-denial and deterrence and have been used widely in
Europe; whereas marauding Mumbai-style attacks have been used to devastating effect
in Norway and, more recently, France.
Moreover, CBW have relative disadvantages over other means of causing harm. As
discussed below, CBW are complex and the pursuit of such weapons generates opportunity
costs; they are frequently met with opprobrium, to the extent that the adoption and use of
such weapons could alienate many otherwise sympathetic constituents and potentially
generate a comparatively more robust response from states; and the acquisition,
development and or testing of such weapons can leave groups vulnerable to detection, a
risk which is particularly pronounced in the European environmental context.
This notion of relative advantage (and disadvantage) and multiple utilities of CBW
weapons suggests a note of caution inﬁxating European policy on preventing the proliferation
of new, high-tech chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, particularly if such a
policy is pursued at a cost to efforts to prevent pernicious CBW with effects short of mass
destruction. Indeed, it suggests a need for the EU and the composite member states to guard
against a spectrum of possible CBW health threats, ranging from the use of more high-tech
forms of chemical and biological weapons with gigantic effect on humans, to localised
opportunistic attacks, including attacks on agriculture, livestock and even material.
2. Complexity
The second factor is “the perceived complexity of the innovation in terms of adoption
and use”.40 This is important in the innovation literature, as Rogers remarked, “[t]he
complexity of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is negatively
related to its rate of adoption”.41 Several scholars of terrorist innovation have also
highlighted the issue of complexity;42 or, as Cragin et al have stated, “[h]ow simple or
complex a technology appears affects perceptions of how risky it will be to adopt.”43
38 P Gill and others, “Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist Organizations” (2013) 47 Journal of Creative Behavior 125.
39 Europol, TE-SAT 2016, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016”, doi:10.2813/525171; see
also Gill, supra, note 38, 133.
40 Rasmussen, supra, note 11.
41 Rogers, supra, note 18, 242.
42 Dolnik, supra, note 5.
43 K Cragin and others, “Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies”
(RAND Corporation, 2007).
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In most cases terrorist groups appear to have largely opted for the simplest pathway
towards the achievement of their goals and the weapons used tend to be vernacular,
functional devices drawing on local and readily-available materials, rather than
sophisticated, “baroque” technologies. This is certainly the case with IEDs, the history
of which is characterised largely by incremental innovations – although nevertheless
frequently effective ones – with many means of delivery recycled from the past.44
Complexity can therefore be seen as important in the adoption of technology by terrorists
generally, but is perhaps particularly acute in the case of CBW technology.
Some CBW can be relatively simple: “chlorine-augmented, vehicle-borne IEDs,” as
employed by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from 2006 to 2007 are not sophisticated
weapons.45 Attacks on chemical production facilities, an apparent tactic of Serbian
forces in the early to mid-1990s,46 employed relatively simple technologies –
speciﬁcally explosives – with toxicity a secondary by-product. Direct contamination of
food,47 drink48 or healthcare products49 does not require particularly sophisticated
technology for the purposes of delivery – although may require some considerable skill
to culture and scale-up a biological agent – and has been a common approach in
European CBW incidents.50 Similarly, the contamination of water systems, something
familiar to Europe,51 can also be relatively easily attempted. However, in most cases
such methods of dissemination have generated results that are far short of the “mass
destruction” that CBW are associated with, although this does not mean such a
possibility can be ignored by those working on public health preparedness.
Although some relatively simple approaches could cause signiﬁcant harm, mass casualty
attacks still require considerable expertise, something particularly acute in the context of
biological weapons.52 Themost effective route to weaponising biology is arguably through the
process of aerosolising agents, something recognised mid-way through the last century as
opening up the theoretical possibility of using biological weapons on a gigantic scale.53
However, realising such theoretical potential is difﬁcult and it took states decades to develop
44 J Revill, Improvised Explosive Devices – The Paradigmatic Weapon of New Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
45 Welch, supra, note 23, 12–13.
46
“From 1993 to 1995, for example, Serbian forces launched six attacks on a Petrochemia facility near Kutina,
Croatia, that stored large quantities of anhydrous ammonia as well as a variety of other potentially hazardous chemicals;
these attacks involved rockets, bombs, artillery, and mortars”: T Karasik, Toxic Warfare (RAND Project Air Force,
2002).
47 See for example the cases of food poisoning reported, although not conﬁrmed, H Mohtadi and A Murshid, “A
Global Chronology of Incidents of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950–2005” (7 July 2006),
available at <https://people.uwm.edu/mohtadi/ﬁles/2016/07/A-Global-Chronology-of-Incidents-of-Chemical-
Biological-and-Radionuclear-Attacks.doc-1u8sbvu.pdf>.
48 Kuntal Patel poisoning her “controlling” mother in law via a soft drink, supra, note 28.
49 See for example the case of the Minesota Patriots in N Khardori, Potential Agents of Bioterrorism: Historical
Perspective and an Overview (2006) and Carus, supra, note 21.
50 See for example: the 2014 Kuntal Patel case of Coke poisoning; the 1984 Rajneesh cult poisoning of salad bars;
Steven Robinsons’ contamination of Vladivar vodka in 2007; the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) plan to contaminate
bottles of Lucozade in 1991; or the threatened – not undertaken – contamination of Coca-Cola and Nestlé products with
hydrochloric acid by the Informal Anarchist Federation.
51 For example, in the 1960s the “Provos”, the Dutch counter-culture revolutionaries, threatened to disseminate LSD
in the Dutch water system: R Kempton, Provo: Amsterdam’s Anarchist Revolt (New York, Autonomedia, 2007).
52 As much is explicitly recognised in Anders Breivik’s manifesto, which suggests the use of anthrax requires
“extensive practical knowledge, training, and highly advanced equipment”.
53 Revill, Mcleish and Robinson, supra, note 27.
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more predictable biological weapons,54 and even then such weapons were acutely vulnerable
to environmental factors.55 For non-state groups such complexity has proven a signiﬁcant
barrier to CBW development. By means of an example, one of the best-resourced biological
weapons programs, that of Aum Shinrikyo, failed variously because the group acquired the
wrong strain, contaminated fermenters and were faced with insurmountable production and
dissemination difﬁculties.56 There are of course exceptions, such as the 2001 anthrax Letter
Attacks in the US. However, if one accepts the conclusions of the FBI that this sophisticated
attack with aerosolised anthrax in the US postal system was perpetrated by a US biodefence
researcher, Dr Bruce Ivins,57 it is an exception that proves the rule.
To circumvent the difﬁculties with aerosolisation, arguably one could use human-to-
human transmissible biological agents as part of a suicide bioterror operation. There are
good reasons for concern over how crude suicide bioterrorists could employ such a
tactic. However, the use of highly contagious agents is also poorly predictable and would
have to deal with social factors, such as the “spatial contact process among individuals”,
which can spell “out the difference between large-scale epidemics and abortive ones”.58
The counter to this argument is the growing access to data and the changing human
geography of the life sciences. Some 83% of European households reportedly are online,
effectively allowing access to what is a growing body of available data on CBW,
including so-called bioterrorist “recipes” and “blueprints” that are available in both
mainstream scientiﬁc as well as more subversive literatures online. It is also clear that
there is a changing human geography in European life sciences (for peaceful purposes),
with the emergence of 30 DIY-bio groups located in Europe59 and some 80 European
teams in the international Genetically Engineered Machines (IGEM) competition in
2016.60 This is compounded by reports that groups such as Daesh have deliberately
sought to recruit foreign ﬁghters “including some with degrees in physics, chemistry,
and computer science, who experts believe have the ability to manufacture lethal
weapons from raw substances”.61
Whilst it would be unwise to ignore such developments, there is a need for caution in
looking at the extent to which new technologies and geographies will facilitate the adoption of
chemical and biological weapons by groups seeking to target European countries. First,
data is not information, and information is not knowledge, let alone the tacit knowledge
54 SIPRI, The Prevention of CBW. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Volume V (SIPRI, in association
with Oxford University Press, 1971).
55 RD Kirby, The Sergeant: A Biological Missile (Eximdyne, 2014).
56 R Danzig and others, Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons, 2nd
edn (Center for a New American Security, 2012), available at <http://www.cnas.org/ﬁles/documents/publications/
CNAS_AumShinrikyo_SecondEdition_English.pdf>; M Leitenberg, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Efforts to Produce Biological
Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propagation of Misinformation” (1999) 11 Terrorism and Political Violence 149.
57 This remains a controversial conclusion of the FBI investigation which remains unproved in a court of law as Ivins
took his life before trial.
58 Derek Cummings Epstein, Shubha Chakravarty, Ramesh Singa, and Donald Burke J, Toward a Containment
Strategy for Smallpox Bioterror: An Individual-Based Computational Approach (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
59 In 2016, according to the DIY-bio website there are some 88 DIY bio groups, with 6 in Canada, 36 in the US, 6 in
Latin America, 29 in Europe, 7 in Asia and 4 in Oceana. The DIYbio Google group has 4,665 members.
60 305 teams registered with 300 remaining in the 2016 Internationally Genetic Engineering Machines competition.
61 Immenkamp, Beatrix. “ISIL/Da’esh and ‘Non-Conventional’ Weapons of Terror,” 2015. <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572806/EPRS_BRI(2015)572806_EN.pdf>.
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required for CBW.62 In many cases a degree of determination and dedication will be required
merely to separate online fantasy from fact and identify operationally useful information (of
relevance to the European context) from nonsense (or information pertinent to contexts other
than Europe). Second, with new technologies there is the potential for such tools to enable
some, but certainly not all, actors, and even then new technologies bring new challenges.
CRISPR, gene editing technology is currently seen as a particular source of promise and peril,
which purportedly enables “even largely untrained people to manipulate the very essence of
life”.63 As much may be technically true, yet “untrained people” would nonetheless require
some guidance in identifying suitable areas of genetic structures to manipulate. Moreover,
CRISPR would only get aspiring weaponeers so far, with the process of culturing, scaling-up
and weaponisation still requiring considerable attention and interdisciplinary skills, typically
generated through “large interdisciplinary teams of scientists, engineers, and technicians”,64 in
order to be effective.
Indeed, for all the progress in science and technology, biological weapons are still not
used, in part, because of the complexity of such weapons; and the chemical weapons that
are used today are largely the same as the chemical weapons of 100 years ago. As
Robinson noted “It remains the case today that, in the design of CBW, increasingly
severe technological constraint sets in as the mass-destruction end of the spectrum is
approached: the greater and more assured the area-effectiveness sought for the weapon,
the greater the practical difﬁculties of achieving it”.65
Thus, although complexity is an important factor, it is not an argument for complacency.
Rather it highlights the signiﬁcance of, ﬁrst, guarding against technological surprise, including
the shock of the old and the scruffy; and, second, sensitising those with the potential skill-sets
to contribute to serious programs to dual-use risks and engaging scientists in academic and
industry. Past research has suggested there is a low-level of awareness of dual-use risks
amongst academics working in the ﬁelds of chemistry and biology across Europe,66 and
although there have since been a number of commendable initiatives to raise awareness and
promote a culture of responsibility, including through the recent Hague Ethical Guidelines,67
it is unclear how widely promulgated or sustainable such initiatives have been.
3. Ideology
A third factor is the compatibility of CBW with the ideological outlook of
non-state actors. Ideology matters to the extent it may pre-determine the possibility of
62 See K Vogel, “Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide” (2006) 36 Social
Studies of Science 659; J Revill and C Jefferson, “Tacit Knowledge and the Biological Weapons Regime” (2014) 41
Science and Public Policy 597.
63 DM Gerstein, “Can the Bioweapons Convention Survive Crispr?” (2016) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 25 July
2016, available at http://thebulletin.org/can-bioweapons-convention-survive-crispr9679.
64 S Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, “Barriers to Bioweapons : Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation Barriers to
Bioweapons” (2012) 36 International Security 80.
65 JP Robinson, “Near-Term Development of the Governance Regime for Biological and Chemical Weapons”
(Science & Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, 2006).
66 See J Revill and others, “Biosecurity Education: Surveys from Europe and Japan”, Inter Academy Panel Workshop
on Promoting Education on Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences (2009).
67 OPCW, “The Hague Ethical Guidelines” (2016), available at <https://www.opcw.org/ﬁleadmin/OPCW/
Science_Technology/Hague_Ethical_Guidelines_Brochure.pdf>.
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adoption or not.68 As Ackerman has noted “[p]ractices that enjoy greater legitimacy,
culturally or otherwise, in the wider social system are likely to diffuse more quickly than
those that do not.”69 Many means and methods of causing harm – from the crossbow to
aerial bombardment to dumb-dumb bullets – have been subject to opprobrium. Yet
unlike other such weapons where norms have eroded, chemical and biological weapons
have largely continued to remain subject to a cross-cultural norm against their
acquisition, development and use, to the extent some have described CBW as “taboo”.70
Moreover, this is a norm which has been reinforced and codiﬁed through the
development of an international governance regime comprising of treaties, such as the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and national laws that have been
relatively well implemented across EU member states.
However, as history indicates, the norm against CBW is not inviolable; rather it
remains a social construct and, as such, remains subject to change particularly with
advances in science and technology and a rapidly changing security context.71 This is a
particular concern in light of the adoption and continued use of chemical weapons by
actors involved in the Syrian conﬂict, a trend that has the potential to erode notions of
CBW as an ideological anathema. As Guthrie has stated “There is certainly a huge risk of
normalising [the use of chemical weapons] … This latest allegation of use is another
contribution to the slow and steady diminishing of the taboo.”72
Moreover, there remains a risk that CBW may be perceived as more ideologically
compatible amongst contemporary violent extremist groups than in the past. As a recent
European Parliamentary Research Service brieﬁng indicated “ISIL/Da’esh is considered
to be particularly dangerous because of its radical ideology and its declared intention to
shock: the group has used ‘shock tactics’ effectively to attract new recruits”.73 This
inclination to shock, including through the use of novel, extreme tactics, suggests CBW
could potentially be compatible with the tactics of groups, such as Daesh. Moreover,
signiﬁcant ﬁgures such as Bin Laden, as well as certain Islamic scholars, have explicitly
encouraged the adoption and use of CBW. For example Al Qaeda’s ﬂagship magazine
Inspire cited religious scholars as encouraging Jihadists to “…throw on them ﬁre, snakes
or scorpions…”, “… Put blood, feces or poison in their water…”, and “…strike them
with … scorpions snakes and all what harms them…”.
Yet whilst alarming, it is of note that Daesh have not been particularly forthcoming in
claiming responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria (or Iraq), although they
are willing to actively promote other shocking acts. Furthermore, the justiﬁcation for
CBW is rather weak to any critical appraisal; “throwing scorpions” is a far cry from
68 A Moghadam, “How Al Qaeda Innovates” (2013) 22 Security Studies 466, available at <http://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2013.816123>.
69 G Ackerman, “Appendix III’ in Rasmussen, supra, note 11.
70 RM Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Cornell University Press, 1997); C Jefferson, “The Taboo of Chemical
and Biological Weapons: Nature, Norms and International Law” (University of Sussex, 2009).
71 J Littlewood, “How Norms Breakdown: Can Chemical and Biological Weapons Become Accepted?” ISA
conference paper (2016).
72 R Guthrie, as quoted in E Graham-Harrison, “Chemical weapons attacks in Syria may normalise war crimes, experts
warn”, The Guardian (11 August 2016).
73 Beatrix Immenkamp, “ISIL/Da’esh and ‘Non-Conventional’Weapons of Terror” (2015), available at <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572806/EPRS_BRI(2015)572806_EN.pdf>.
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weapons of mass destruction and the comments of three Imams is surely outweighed by a
statement attributed to the ﬁrst Caliph exhorting troops to “overcome their enemies by
bravery and never by poison”.74 Nevertheless, the more frequent use of low-level
chemicals remains a cause of consternation because of the challenge they pose to the
norm against such weapons, the visibility these events give to chemical weapons, and the
potential for chemical weapons adoption to become “darkly fashionable” among
extremist groups outside of Syria and Iraq.
4. Organisational factors
Organisational factors are important, something noted by several scholars,75 but neatly
articulated by Kollars and Bristert: “decentralized organizations excel at generating new
ideas, [but] they carry them out poorly. Conversely, centralized organizations can more
easily coordinate attacks, but are hypothetically less innovative”.76 This argument is
certainly borne-out in the context of IED innovation in Europe;77 however, the role
of organisational factors in CBW adoption is less clear, with some well-documented
case studies, such as that of Aum Shinrikyo, suggesting innovation is possible in
certain highly centralised organisations, but particularly those with a leadership with a
“techno-fetishist afﬁnity”78 towards such weapons.
Nonetheless, it remains a concern that recent exhortations from radical groups have
encouraged those unable to participate in Jihad directly in countries, such as Iraq, to
wage a much more disaggregated and decentralised Jihad.79 This has been achieved
either through “lone wolf” attacks undertaken without any direct support80 or, more
signiﬁcantly, “remotely guided plots”, that is “violence conceived and guided by
operatives in areas controlled by the Islamic State whose only connection to the would-
be attacker is the internet.”81 Lone wolf attacks are comparatively rare in Europe and,
although they can be devastating (such as in the case of the terrorist attack by Anders
Breivik, which arguably falls within the “lone wolf” category), an analysis of lone wolf
attacks in Europe by Ellis et al suggests that “76 per cent failed to cause any fatalities”.82
More common of late have been plots in which individuals have been remotely
encouraged and/or guided through the internet; according to Burke, such plots include a
“wave of attack[s] in France” in 2015 and a number of incidents in Germany.83
74 JP Zanders, “International Norms against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy” (2003) 8
Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 391.
75 Horowitz, supra, note 6, 33; Rasmussen, supra, note 11.
76 NA Kollars and PD Bristert, “The Terrorists That Couldn’t: Seeing Terrorist Innovation as a Risky Venture” (2014)
8 The Homeland Security Review 199.
77 Revill, supra, note 44.
78 Nehorayof, Ash and Smith, supra, note 32.
79 Dugald McConnell and Brian Todd “Al Qaeda branch calls for new attacks against United States” CNN (5 August 2015).
80 C Ellis and others, “Lone-Actor Terrorism: Final Report” (2016), available at <https://rusi.org/publication/
occasional-papers/lone-actor-terrorism-ﬁnal-report>.
81 R Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All : How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots From Afar” The New York
Times (4 February 2017), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-
plot.html?_r=0>.
82 Ellis and others, supra, note 80.
83 J Burke, “The Myth of the ‘lone Wolf’ Terrorist” The Guardian (30 March 2017), available at <https://www.
theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist>.
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Neither “lone wolves” nor the perpetrators of “remotely guided plots” in Europe have
seemingly sought to use CBW and, even taking into account that these decentralised entities
have excelled at generating new ideas and demonstrated the capacity to carry them out, such
attacks have so far involved relatively unsophisticated weapons. As signiﬁcant CBW
programs will likely require a number of social commitments and external linkages to
function – from supply chains to expertise – it seems signiﬁcant CBW adoption appears
largely incompatible, or less compatible, with either decentralised remotely guided terrorism
or smaller loosely afﬁliated group actors. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of
groups virtually sharing operationally-relevant information pertaining to low-level, scruffy
CBW or indeed facilitating the delivery of precursor chemicals and equipment intended for
European targets from afar.84
5. Visibility and “Fashionability” of CBW
A ﬁfth factor is the visibility, and perhaps the “fashionability” of CBW. Non-state groups
cannot use a weapon that they or their networks are not aware of. As the, then,
Al Qaeda number two, Ayman Al Zawahiri, reportedly stated “… [Al Qaeda] only became
aware of [chemical and biological weapons] when the enemy drew our attention to them
by repeatedly expressing concern that they can be produced cheaply”.85 In contrast, when
there are visible examples of success, “Militant groups will seek to emulate tactics they
deem as particularly novel, effective, and fear-inducing”.86 This copy-cat-type process has
been well documented with other forms of terrorist innovation87 and suggests there is
potential for CBW to become somehow darkly “fashionable”.
Fashionability certainly seems to have had a bearing on small-scale ricin plots, long a
source of fascination amongst right-wing extremists in the US, the success of the TV
series “Breaking Bad” increased the number of copycat efforts to use ricin in personal
attacks, although not in a manner necessarily consistent with a wider understanding
of CBW terrorism.88 Similarly anthrax hoaxes and white powder letters increased
signiﬁcantly following the Amerithrax attack in 2001;89 and, to provide some historical
perspective, France endured a “wave of vitriolage” in the late 1880s with an estimated
“83 reported cases” of chemical assault through acid throwing.90
A more recent example of greater concern for contemporary European security, is the use
of chemical weapons in Syria. A report titled ANewNormal by the Syrian AmericanMedical
Society reports treating “victims from at least 161 chemical attacks”.91 Whilst this is difﬁcult
84 Callimachi, supra, note 81.
85 M Leitenberg, “Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat”, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
Monograph (2005).
86 Moghadam, supra, note 68.
87 Gill and others, supra, note 38.
88 S Brown, “ManWho Bought Ricin Dealt in ‘death’, Prosecutors Say” New York Daily News (2015); supra, note 28;
S Stanton and DWalsh, “Inspired by ‘Breaking Bad,’ Carmichael man turned to Internet poison sales” The Sacremento
Bee (2016); D Nelson, “Iowa man gets 35 years for ‘Breaking Bad’ ricin murder plot”, News 10 ABC (2016).
89 FBI, “FBIWarns Against Anthrax Hoaxes Recent National Press Releases” (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
2001), available at <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-warns-against-anthrax-hoaxes>.
90 J Welsh, “A Comparative Exploration of Acid Attack Violence”, Center for Global on International Health,
Carolina Papers on International Health No 32 (2009).
91 Syrian American Medical Society, “A New Normal – Ongoing Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria” (2016).
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to verify, the UN-OPCWJoint InvestigativeMechanism (JIM) has indicated there is evidence
of a small number of attacks having been carried out in Syria, themajority of which have been
carried out by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces,92 but at least one is believed to have been
undertaken by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).93 Similarly, French intelligence
has reported ﬁve “proven” cases of sarin use “attributed to the Syrian regime”, 22 cases in
which they have a “strong presumption of the use of chlorine by the Syrian regime” and three
incidents of “Mustard gas attack attributed to Daesh”.94 Such ongoing reports of chemical
weapons use in Syria suggests that low-level chemical weapons are increasingly visible,
raising the possibility of CW becoming more darkly fashionable as a tool of non-state actors,
something potentially ampliﬁed by sensationalist media headlines.
6. Environmental context
A ﬁnal cluster of factors is the wider environmental context,95 including the space to trial
weapons; the extent of countermeasures and preparedness of target populations; and the
availability of “windows of opportunity”. The space to test and trial new weapons has
been identiﬁed as important in Rogers’ work on “trialability”, that is “the degree to
which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis”. 96 Several scholars
of terrorist innovation have also emphasised the importance of a “hospitable
environment” as a precondition for terrorist innovation,97 with Dolnik demonstrating
how safe havens provide space and time for innovation.98 This appears the case with
signiﬁcant historical IED campaigns,99 but also seemingly with major CBW events. For
example, Aum beneﬁted from considerable time and space (as well as resources) for their
program and reportedly “attempted at least ten chemical agent and ten biological agent
attacks”,100 prior to “succeeding” with sarin in Tokyo;101 whereas the Rajneeshees had
several attempts at testing poisons before “successfully” contaminating salad bars with
salmonella. In contrast, the crude CSA plot to contaminate water supplies was foiled,
although as Carus notes, in time “CSA members might have found a more effective
means of delivering cyanide if they had not been stopped by the FBI”.102 It is notable in
92 OPCW/UN, “Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint
Investigative Mechanism” (2016); and OPCW/UN, 2016. Fourth report of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.
93 Marea, Aleppo governorate, 21 August 2015. OPCW/UN, “Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism” (2016) p. 14.
94 France, “Allegations of Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria since 2012” (2017), available at <http://www.
diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/170425_-_national_evaluation_annex_-_anglais_-_ﬁnal_1_cle8211fe.pdf>.
95 Kollars and Bristert, supra, note 76.
96 Rogers, supra, note 7.
97 G Ackerman, “Appendix III’ in Rasmussen, supra, note 11.
98 See also Cragin, who argues that groups will seek to “test drive” a technology before committing to adopt can
provide signiﬁcant information and reduce adoption risks”: K Cragin and others, “Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth Terrorist
Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies” (RAND Corporation, 2007).
99
“Kibalchich [Narodnaya Volya] tested his explosive devices in the forest along the Russian/Finnish border; the
[IRA] developed bombs in secluded locations away from the border, presumably in part to be able to test devices; and
Marwan Kreeshat trialled his altimeter bomb in the mountains in Germany”; Revill, supra, note 44.
100 Nehorayof, Ash and Smith, supra, note 32.
101 Danzig, supra, note 56.
102 Carus in Tucker, supra, note 25.
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this regard that the European context is not a particularly “hospitable environment” for
acquiring and trialling chemical or biological weapons, with a series of EU counter-
terrorism projects having been undertaken to detect CBW and prevent the proliferation
of dual-use materials.103
Second, yet related to the above, government countermeasures have been highlighted
by several scholars as important drivers of “innovation as terrorists seek to circumvent
new security procedures”.104 In addition to which, in the case of CBW, the preparedness
of target states to react and respond to CBW use may also have a bearing on the methods
and targets of non-state actors, with robust emergency response systems and resilient
societal fabrics potentially undermining the appeal of CBW. In this regard, it is
encouraging that at the European level, response and resilience have been given
considerable attention through projects, such as the EU Framework 7, “End-user driven
DEmo for cbrNE” or EDEN project105 as well as the establishment of the Early Warning
and Response System, and Rapid Alert System for biological and chemical incidents.106
A third element of the environmental context cluster are “windows of opportunity” to
acquire and potentially use CBW with the “use of chemical weapons in conﬂict areas…
largely conditioned by availability and means of dissemination in the region”.107 One of
the reasons for the rise and rise of IEDs in Iraq circa 2006, was, in part, the convergence
and availability of IED components and skills, drawing from pilfered weapons caches
and locally available materials and supported by former Baathist regime expertise; but
also, in part, because of the windows of opportunity for using IEDs against coalition
forces and the wide range of then-accessible targets.108 The same opportunism can also
be detected in some past cases of CBW adoption and use by non-state actors, for
example, the Tamil Tiger’s seizure of chlorine cylinders in 1990 “was opportunistic in
that the chlorine was readily available and satisﬁed an urgent military need”; whereas
AQI’s chlorine augmented truck bombs also appear opportunistic.109 As Karasik, has
suggested “those who use toxic weapons are also taking whatever opportunities become
available”.110
The European context offers a number of possible sources of dual-use materials.
However, key precursors are largely “under strict control of governments”,111 and whilst
103 See European Commission, “European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations” (EU/ECHO, 2016)
<http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/ﬁnancing-civil-protection-europe/selected-projects_en>; see also Council of
the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
Security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan” (2009).
104 Rasmussen, supra, note 11, 33; Ackerman has certainly illustrated this point in relation to the development of
IRA mortars as a response to the fortiﬁcation of key targets: see G Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army
and the Development of Mortars” (2016) 9 Journal of Strategic Security 12, available at <http://scholarcommons.usf.
edu/jss/vol9/iss1/4/> 14.
105 Eden Consortium, “EDEN Project”, see <https://eden-security-fp7.eu/eden,id,11,about.html>.
106 European Commission, “European Commission Early Warning and Rapid Alert Systems in the Field of Health
Threats” (European Commission Public Health, 2017), available at <https://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/
generic_preparedness/planning/rapid_alert_en>.
107 Supra, note 39.
108 Revill, supra, note 44.
109 JB Tucker, “The Future of Chemical Weapons” (2010) The New Atlantis 3.
110 Karasik, supra, note 46.
111 Supra, note 39.
15The Risk of Non-State Actors’ Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons2017
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2017.35
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 29 Sep 2017 at 14:26:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
low-level chemical weapons ingredients, speciﬁcally toxic industrial chemicals (TICs),
may be widespread across Europe, the barriers to acquiring such materials are likely to be
relatively more robust, although not infallible. Moreover, there have also been a
considerable number of national initiatives (including those intended to develop penal
legislation and enforcement capacity) across Europe, and the basic legal and regulatory
components are in place in most cases. It will be important to ensure that such measures
are both enforced and are not solely WMD-centric, but able to deal with acts of
acquisition and development which whilst pernicious, fall short of efforts to acquire
weapons capable of mass destruction in humans. It will also be important to ensure that
states developed the necessary investigative expertise to pursue and prosecute crimes
involving chemical and biological weapons. This may require speciﬁc skill sets in order
to inter alia, preserve the chain of evidence and provide robust forensic analysis, as well
as mechanisms for cooperation with actors in other jurisdictions and across national
borders in order to be effective.112
III. CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that the adoption of CBW by non-state actors has been inﬂuenced
by a number of interlinked clusters of factors, including the relative advantage, the
complexity, ideological compatibility, organisational structure, visibility and
environmental context. Although there are limits to detailed data on such factors in
relation to a long and diverse history of past case studies, there are nonetheless some
generalisable lessons that may be learned from the past which can inform the future.
First, the relative advantages to CBW lie not necessarily in simply killing, but in other
utilities such as economic sabotage, the generation of media attention and prestige;
incapacitation; criminal purposes; destabilisation and disruption; deterrence and denial.
Certain utilities, such as sabotage, destabilisation, disruption and denial in particular,
can be ampliﬁed by sensationalist press coverage which in turn can generate a
disproportionate reaction. The range of utilities and potential for ampliﬁcation means
that CBWmay appeal to a variety of different groups in the future, including Daesh, but
also, potentially, white supremacist groups, environmentalist and other violent extremist
movements. However, the adoption of CBW by such groups also has disadvantages. The
consequences of CBW adoption by non-state actors, if proven, would be signiﬁcant with
many EU countries imposing signiﬁcant custodial sentences for acquisition. If this does
not serve as a deterrent, the complexity of CBW, the potential opportunity costs of
pursuing CBW over other means of causing harm and the risk of alienating otherwise
sympathetic constituencies through association with CBW, might serve to dissuade.
Complexity is a major factor that is changing to some extent with advances in the life
sciences and the development of enabling technologies. However, signiﬁcant biological
and chemical weapons remain complex and complicated – although the same cannot be
said for scruffy chemical weapons. This suggests that there is a need to guard against
technological surprise including the shock of the old (and the scruffy). Moreover, it is
112 Sibylle Bauer and AWetter, “Comparing Sanctions and Prosecutions Related to Export Control Violations in the
EU” (UK Quadripartite Select Committee, 2007).
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also apparent that any sense of ideological opprobrium towards chemical weapons may
erode with the continued use of such weapons by state and non-state actors in Syria, in
the process ‘chipping away’ at the norm against chemical weapons and potentially
leading to such weapons becoming somehow grimly “fashionable”.
Organisationally, the apparent trend towards “remotely guided plots” works against
the adoption of sophisticated CBW which will likely require a more centralised
development process; but not necessarily the adoption of low-level chemical weapons.
Although Europe is relatively well regulated, with dual-use precursors comparatively
better controlled and response systems relatively well-developed than in other parts of
the world, it cannot be overlooked that lucky amateurs might be able to successfully
adopt and develop CBW with signiﬁcant effect, despite the odds against them and the
challenges to tradecraft in Europe.
This presents a rather fuzzy risk spectrum for those seeking to prevent, prosecute and
respond to CBW adoption across Europe. Moreover it is a risk spectrum for which
neither technological quick ﬁxes nor simple, siloed solutions can be applied. There are a
number of things that have been – and are being – done to prevent such weapons being
adopted and used: from softer ethical guidelines to reinforce the norm, to penal
legislative measures. Yet it needs to be recognised that such measures can only reduce
the risk, not eliminate it and efforts towards prevention need to be complimented with an
all-hazard public health preparedness capability able to tackle a number of possible
CBW-related scenarios.
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